The Securities and Exchange Commission has proposed proxy rules mandating shareholder access under conditions that can be modified by a shareholder majority to make proxy access easier, but not more difficult. The Proposing Release, however, contradicts the Proposed Rules in two distinct respects that render the Proposed Rules arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.
The text of the Proposing Release is, however, at war with the text of the Proposed Rules in a clash that generates two profound contradictions. Each contradiction is sufficiently material that there is little prospect that the Proposed Rules can withstand challenge under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA").
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The first contradiction relates to core principles of shareholder self determination.
A fundamental premise of every proxy access proposal is that the majority of shareholders are sufficiently intelligent and responsible that they can be relied upon to nominate and elect directors other than the nominees proposed by an incumbent board. If this premise is correct, then these same shareholders are also sufficiently intelligent and responsible to define the protocols governing when, how, and to whom access is granted.
But the Proposed Rules prohibit the identical shareholder majority from establishing a proxy access regime, or from amending the Proposed Rules to establish more stringent access standards. The Commission fails to explain how or why shareholders are so selectively intelligent or responsible. It cites no support for the proposition that shareholders can be relied upon to nominate and vote on directors, but not to set the rules by which directors are nominated and elected. Absent a rational basis upon which to conclude that shareholders are selectively intelligent or responsible in a manner that supports discriminatory reliance on the majority's mandate, the Mandatory Minimum Access Regime cannot withstand scrutiny under the APA.
A second contradiction relates to the Commission's repeated assertion that the Proposed Rules merely modify the proxy process better to replicate the physical 44 See Section 5, infra.
shareholder meeting as governed by state law. Nothing in state law sets a minimum standard for proxy access, defines the contours of any proxy access proposal that must be considered by shareholders, or prohibits a majority of shareholders from amending a proxy access standard to make it more stringent while forbidding the same majority to make it more relaxed. The Proposed Rules thus fail utterly to replicate the shareholder meeting process. Instead, they impose restrictions that exist nowhere in corporate law.
Again, absent a rational explanation that resolves this contradiction, the Proposed Rules cannot withstand APA scrutiny.
How can these contradictions be eliminated? In theory, the Commission could disavow its commitment to shareholder self-determination and to the replication of the state law meeting process. But if the Commission does not believe in shareholder selfdetermination, then what does it believe in? And, if the Commission does not believe in shareholder self-determination, then how can it be a strong advocate of proxy access? Also, if the Commission is not replicating the shareholder meeting process as governed by state law, then is it in the business of writing a federal corporation code? If not, from where do the principles guiding proxy access emanate?
Alternatively, and more realistically, the Commission can cure its self-created contradictions by restructuring the Proposed Rules so that they are fully enabling. Fully enabling rules would create shareholder referenda pursuant to which shareholders could propose, and a majority could adopt, proxy access standards for each individual corporation. No other strategy resolves the contradictions inherent in the Commission's Proposing Release, or generates a rulemaking record able to withstand APA review.
These same observations are relevant to the rules that the Commission might adopt in the event Congress enacts legislation mandating proxy access. Pending legislation would resolve questions regarding the Commission's statutory authority to adopt proxy access rules, but would not affect the Commission's obligation to comply with the APA.
The Proposed Mandatory Minimum Access Regime
The Commission proposes to add one new rule and amend an existing rule.
Proposed Rule 14a-11 would provide for proxy access in the event a nominating shareholder, or group of shareholders, of a large accelerated filer have, for at least one year, held one percent or more of the company's voting securities.
5 Access would not be available to stockholders seeking a change in control, or to stockholders seeking more than a limited number of seats on a board. 6 Nominating stockholders would be required to make certain disclosures, subject to the antifraud provisions of Rule 14a-9. 7 These disclosures include representations that the nominees satisfy the objective criteria for director independence set forth in listing standards, that there is no agreement with the company regarding the nomination of the nominees, and that the nominating stockholders intend to continue holding the requisite number of shares through the date of the stockholder meeting. 8 Disclosure would also be required of relationships between the nominating stockholders, the nominee, and the company, if any.
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Modifications to Rule 14a-8(i)(8) would recast the election exclusion so as to require that companies include in their proxy materials stockholder proposals that would amend, or propose to amend, the company's governing documents regarding shareholder nominations. The proposals could not, however, weaken or eliminate the proxy access criteria prescribed by proposed Rule 14a-11.
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Taken together, the Proposed Rules create a mandatory form of proxy access to be imposed on all publicly traded corporations subject to the rule, even if the majority of each corporation's shareholders object strenuously to the operation of the Proposed
Rules. The Proposed Rules would permit modifications making access easier for stockholder-nominated directors, but forbid modification making access more difficult.
Again, the will of the shareholder majority is irrelevant to the Commission. The Proposed Rules are thus accurately described as creating a "Mandatory Minimum Access Regime."
The First Contradiction: Self Determination and Proxy Access
A fundamental premise of every proxy access proposal is that the majority of shareholders are sufficiently intelligent and responsible that they can be relied upon to nominate and elect directors other than the nominees proposed by an incumbent board. If this premise is correct, then the same shareholders are sufficiently intelligent and responsible that they can be relied upon to determine whether proxy access should apply at any particular corporation. They are also sufficiently intelligent and responsible to define the protocols governing when, how, and to whom access is granted.
As the Proposing Release explains, "we believe that investors are best protected when they can exercise the rights they have as shareholders, without unnecessary obstacles imposed by the federal proxy rules." 11 These rights include the right to set standards governing proxy access and are not limited to the right to approve nominees pursuant to a Mandatory Minimum Access Regime adopted without any regard for the will of the majority. It is more than a touch ironic that the Mandatory Minimum Access
Regime actually eliminates the shareholders' right to propose and adopt proxy access standards, thereby creating the very "unnecessary obstacles imposed by the federal proxy rules" that the Proposing Release purports to eliminate.
Indeed, there is no intellectually credible argument that shareholders are selectively intelligent and responsible: that they are competent to elect directors but incompetent to determine the rules governing the election of directors. There is also no support for the proposition that shareholders can be trusted to relax the mandatory minimum standards established by the Commission, but not to strengthen them. The
Commission cites to no theoretical or empirical support for such a proposition, and thus leaves open the question as to whether there is any rational support for its proposed Mandatory Minimum Access Regime.
To be sure, the Proposing Release questions whether the Proposed Rules should be mandatory, whether they should be structured as opt-in or opt-out provisions, and whether shareholders should, pursuant to proposed Rule 14a-8(i)(8), be permitted to offer proposals to make proxy access requirements more rigorous. 12 Each of these questions, however, places the burden of proof with the wrong party. Asking for alternatives to an internally contradictory proposal does not cure the proposal's internal contradictions.
The Second Contradiction: Replicating the Shareholder Meeting.
The Commission asserts that "[t]he proxy rules seek to improve the corporate proxy process so that it functions, as nearly as possible, as a replacement for an actual inperson meeting of the shareholders. Refining the proxy process so that it replicates, as nearly as possible, the annual meeting is particularly important given that the proxy process has become the primary way for shareholders to learn about the matters to be decided by the shareholders and to make their views known to company management."
13
The Proposing Release also states that "[p]arts of the federal proxy process may unintentionally frustrate voting rights under state law, and thereby fail to provide fair corporate suffrage."
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The proposed Mandatory Minimum Access Regime, however, fails utterly to replicate the annual meeting process. As an initial matter, it is for the shareholders themselves to propose and adopt bylaw provisions governing proxy access. These standards are today not imposed by third parties or by state law on the corporation. 15 The proposed Mandatory Minimum Access Regime would, however, impose a standardized, mandatory form of proxy access that replicates nothing about the current annual meeting 13 Id. at 29025, col.3; see also id. n.32. The Proposing Release continues to observe that "[t]he action we take today is focused on removing burdens that the federal proxy process currently places on the ability of shareholders to exercise their basic rights to nominate and elect directors." Id. at 29027, col. 1. 14 Id. at 29027, col.2. 15 The single exception appears to be North Dakota's corporate code which now permits "five percent shareholders to provide a company of notice of intent to nominate directors and require the company to include each such shareholder nominee in its proxy or about any aspect of corporate law governing the operation of those meetings. Thus, rather than promote fidelity to the principles of shareholder democracy as they exist at physical shareholders' meetings, the Commission is inventing a procedure entirely alien to the shareholder voting process. Further, the Mandatory Minimum Access Regime supplies a standard contract term that, even if it existed under state law, would be subject to amendment that could either strengthen the requirements for shareholder access or relax them. In stark contrast, the Commission proposes a set of proxy access standards that preclude all amendments that would relax its requirements.
The conflict between the reality of corporate law and the Commission's assertion that it is merely seeking to replicate the reality of the "actual in-person meeting of the Several of the Commission's more recent prominent rulemakings, adopted as a result of vigorous political pressure, and have not fared well under judicial scrutiny.
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When rules are vacated and remanded, the Commission must restart the rulemaking process and address the concerns raised by the court, if the Commission is to act at all.
That process can take several years. It is thus a Pyrrhic victory, at best, for champions of shareholders rights if the agency adopts proxy access rules that are simply waiting to be vacated and remanded by the courts. If the Commission is intent on crafting proxy access rules that are likely to be implemented on a prompt basis, without being overturned by the courts, then it will have to confront the more vocal and extreme advocates of proxy access. It will have to reject their agenda, and instead adopt a more measured and nuanced set of rules that can pass muster before a dispassionate court that will not be subject to the political pressures that today buffet the agency. 24 Section 3(f) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f), imposes an identical obligation on the Commission to justify its proposed Mandatory Minimum Access Regime. Thus, in addition to the agency's obligation not to contradict itself, the agency has an obligation to explain why its proposed Mandatory Minimum Access Rules "in addition to the protection of investors… will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation" better than existing state law standards. 25 See, e.g., 
Curing the Contradictions
The proposal's internal contradictions are cured if the Proposed Rules are amended to allow shareholder resolutions that define the terms and conditions under which a majority of shareholders can set the rules for proxy access. 26 This "fully enabling" strategy is entirely consistent with principles of shareholder self-determination:
the same shareholders that are sufficiently intelligent and responsible to nominate and vote on director candidates are also sufficiently intelligent and responsible to define the process by which they nominate and elect those directors. 27 This "fully enabling" strategy is also entirely consistent with the Commission's stated desire to replicate the meeting process as it currently exists.
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It is significant to observe that an opt-out approach under which the Commission's mandatory access rule allows a majority of shareholders to amend the rule in any manner they wish, as could be implemented through a revised Rule 14a-8(i)(8), fails to cure either contradiction. Most obviously, the proxy access rules would then not 26 The Commission is, as a legal matter, required to consider this alternative and explain why it is inferior to its Proposed Rules. . The very same logic supports the conclusion that shareholders can "initiate and adopt" proxy access rules. 28 The Commission recognizes that in "CA, Inc. v. AFSCME, 953 A.2d 227 (Del. 2008), the Delaware Supreme Court held that shareholders can propose and adopt a bylaw regulating the process by which directors are elected." 74 Fed. Reg. at 29029 n.70. The Mandatory Minimum Access Regime, however, prevents shareholders from exercising that right because it imposes a proxy access regime without regard to the will of the majority.
replicate the physical shareholder meeting. 29 More fundamentally, an opt-out approach is inconsistent with shareholder self-determination because the Commission would be presuming, without any supporting evidence, that a majority of shareholders at every corporation would prefer an opt-out approach over an opt-in approach. 30 Even worse, the Commission would, without any supporting evidence, be assuming that a majority of shareholders at every corporation would prefer the precise form of default rule proposed by the Commission. Put another way, the Commission would, without any foundation, be assuming its conclusion that a majority of shareholders at every corporation would prefer its Mandatory Minimum Access Regime subject to an opt-out, over the alternative of being able to decide for themselves, ab initio, the rules governing proxy access.
"Just Vote No" and Majority Voting
To be sure, the Commission may be disappointed that it cannot adopt proxy access regulations as intrusive as it would like while still passing muster under the APA.
The Commission may therefore want to consider alternative means of strengthening shareholder voice that can withstand judicial review.
Recent research finds "consistent evidence across a broad set of measures suggesting that on average [just vote no] campaigns are effective in spurring boards to act. The typical target has significant post-campaign operating performance 29 There is no proxy access provision with an opt-out in Delaware or in any other leading commercial state.
The proxy access provisions recently adopted in North Dakota also fail to replicate the Commission's Proposed Rule, even if it is structured as an opt-out provision. See 74 Fed. Reg. at 29029 n.70. 30 The opt-out approach would therefore fail to satisfy the basic conditions for the application of the principles of libertarian paternalism, even if the Commission sought to rely on that literature to support its Proposed Rules. the expressed wishes of the shareholder majority, clearly differ from the Commission's Mandatory Minimum Access Regime which operates with no respect whatsoever for the will of the shareholder majority in establishing the principles governing proxy access.
Conclusion
While "foolish consistency" may be the "hobgoblin of little minds," 40 the inconsistencies between the Proposing Release and the Proposed Rules are far from foolish. They are fundamental to the Commission's enterprise. They are also fatal to the Proposed Rules under the Administrative Procedure Act. The inconsistencies can, however, be cured by revising the Proposed Rules so that they constitute fully enabling provisions that allow a majority of shareholders to adopt a wide range of proxy access rules through an opt-in mechanism. . 41 This brief article focuses on the implications of the inconsistencies between the text of the Proposing Release and the text of the Proposed Rules. It does not address the myriad operational difficulties raised by the Commission's proposals; the adequacy of the rationale supporting the Commission's view that proxy access is the optimal means of enhancing shareholder voice; the evidence (or lack thereof) supporting the view that the current economic crisis is caused, to any material degree, by a lack of proxy access; or the Commission's ability successfully to conduct a §3(f) analysis of its proposed rules. Other commentators are likely to address the operational difficulties inherent in the Commission's proposal. A summary of the argument that proxy access is not the optimal means of addressing the problem of shareholder voice can be found in Grundfest, supra note 34. Counterfactual analysis is likely to suggest that, even if proxy access rules were in place prior to the recent economic crisis, the crisis would neither have been averted nor ameliorated to any material degree. For a description of this form of analysis see, e.g., Frederick C. Dunbar
